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**Congress of the United States**

**House of Representatives**

**Washington, DC 20515-1306**

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Kip Hawley  
Administrator  
TSA-1 Administrator  
Transportation Security Administration  
601 South 12th Street  
Arlington, VA 22202-4220

Dear Administrator Hawley:

I write you with great concern regarding the recent findings reported in two leaked classified Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) reports of decoy explosives being missed by TSA screeners at two of America's busiest airports. I am aware that these leaked findings were from 2005 and 2006 and were only a sampling of tests done during that time, and that they were being pulled together in a 2007 report to build best practices and guidelines. However, I am apprehensive on the findings in these past reports that indicate TSA screeners failed to detect fake bombs hidden on undercover agents posing as passengers in a high percentage of tests. The studies in question conducted at both Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD) are extremely unsettling for my constituents.


Further, I am dismayed at the findings from Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD), located in the district I represent, where screeners missed approximately 60 percent of hidden bomb materials packed in standard carry-on luggage. With over 75 million passengers a year traveling through Chicago O'Hare International Airport, the risk of real bomb components making it on board an aircraft is much greater when TSA is reporting only a 40 percent success rate. This raises serious questions on the safety of our nation's airports.

Respectfully, taking a look at the 2005 and 2006 reports, I would be interested in knowing why San Francisco International Airport (SFO), an airport that uses Covenant/Lockheed Team as their security screener and not TSA, has a problematic rate of only 20 percent. The fact that a private company has a better record than a government agency is unacceptable. I would hope we can further engage on what has been done since these findings to close the gap in the success rate in private screening and TSA screening.

In addition, while I am appreciative of the proactive stance TSA has taken in conducting this investigation, I am still concerned with the results of these findings. The goal is to anticipate the actions of terrorists, and I recognize TSA's actions in conducting these tests. The next goal should be ensuring TSA screeners are properly trained and prepared 100 percent for the task at hand. I would greatly appreciate you providing me with answers to the following questions to ensure my constituents' safety as they travel through O'Hare International Airport.

- What measures are being taken by TSA to rectify the finding of these investigations for 2005 and 2006?
- What, if any, differences are there in training for TSA screeners and private contractors?
- When a screener fails to detect a fake explosive, what are the guidelines and expectations of the remediation process? Are there specific processes failed screeners must go through or are they tailored to each individual airport situation? How long before a continually failing screener is asked to take leave from TSA? Are there incentives for TSA screeners to ensure they are properly prepared and trained?
- How will TSA use this information obtained in these investigations to lower the screening failure percentage?
- Is employee selection and proper technology an issue at TSA?
- Has the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General ever reviewed the hiring, training, and evaluation process of TSA screeners?

If information is classified and cannot be provided in a letter, I will be available for a classified briefing. Please contact me or Michael DeFilippis on my staff at (202)225-4561 should you need my assistance.

Sincerely  
  
Peter Roskam  
Member of Congress